Updates in Evidence-Based Decision Making for Upfront Surgical Interventions in Paediatric Lymphoma.

While there is no consensus on the definition of discrimination, it is generally recognized that the term should be defined as treating individuals unfairly because of their race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation or transgender status), income, national origin, social status, disability, age, or genetic information. Discrimination is important in the clinical context, because it may affect healthcare quality and delivery []. Most research attention has focused on how experience discrimination and the negative consequences it entails, including poorer quality healthcare provision and conflictual provider‐patient relationships. [, ] Less attention has been given to what happens when healthcare providers experience discrimination in the workplace, whether from patients, colleagues, or management. Such discrimination is complex; it may involve interpersonal and collective dimensions, and it may be overt or subtle. Either way, it typically leads to emotional distress, anxiety, sadness, and frustration; however, it also has broader consequences for healthcare delivery, including reduced motivation at work and strained workplace relationships []. Bioethicists can and should develop a more robust approach to social justice, including creating a conceptual basis for addressing discrimination []. This article proposes to add to the conceptual debate by looking at the harms of discrimination related to well‐being. We will mobilize the concept of —which may be defined as something done wrong to someone as an affective being []—to explore the affective harms that come from discrimination in the workplace. Affective injustice is a relatively new concept, having first been conceptualized in 2018 by Amia Srinivasan [] to investigate the role of affects in social movements. Going against the grain, she shows that emotions like anger—typically viewed as negative—actually bring energy to social justice movements, helping to crystallize important issues at hand and bring others into the movement. However, given its negative reputation, expressing anger is often deemed inappropriate by others, including by the leaders of the social movements themselves. Activists are therefore encouraged to suppress their anger and to “calm down” to enable dialogue. Srinivasan describes these types of situations as , situations in which a person must negotiate between apt emotional responses inspired by the injustice of their situation and the reception of these emotions by others. According to her, minimizing or hiding emotions in the face of an injustice often leads to a tragic dilemma, as it forces the person to choose between expressing their legitimate feelings or adapting to others' behavioral expectations of them (often by suppressing or hiding their anger). However, when the person is obliged to change their behavior to fit social expectations, it not only devalues what they feel, but it may also take away energy from the movement. From this perspective, affective injustice not only brings individual but also collective harms. Since this first conceptualization of affective injustice, the concept has been brought closer to the epistemic injustice debate through the work of Archer and Mills []. These researchers define affective injustice as those situations of, “an injustice faced by someone specifically in their capacity as an affective being.” According to them, when one's affects are silenced or misunderstood, this may lead both to epistemic injustices but also to other harms related to well‐being. Indeed, if we can accept that affects are forms of knowledge and being in the world, the inability to express them, to be heard or understood, represents a wrong done to a person in their capacity as a knower []. However, it can also lead to other harms, in particular harms related to the person's well‐being, including feelings of isolation, confusion, additional stress, and anxiety. Concretely, this means that the concept of affective injustice is not just a side topic of epistemic injustice (although there are epistemic elements which should be taken into account), as it may also uncover specific problems related to affective harms.